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NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-AcnoN BETWEEN JoINT ENTERPRISERS

-Plaintiff and his wife were driving from Michigan to Iowa to visit a certain
church to which plaintiff, a minister, was considering a call. Defendant desired
to visit a college in Illinois, with the intention of enrolling as a student. It was
agreed that defendant should ride in plaintiff's automobile to Illinois, where
plaintiff was to help defendant gain admission to the college; later defendant was
to return with the plaintiff to Michigan. The parties alternated in driving the
automobile on the trip. At a certain stage in the journey, defendant negligently
operated the automobile and caused it to become involved in an accident in which
plaintiff suffered injuries and plaintiff's wife was killed. Plaintiff"sued to recover
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damages. On motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the allegations disclosed
a joint enterprise, and that the negligence of the defendant should be imputed
to the plaintiff, barring plaintiff from recovery. On appeal, held, reversed. The
negligence of a member of a joint enterprise1 is not imputable to his fellow member
in an action by the latter against the former. Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich. 146,

40 N.W. (2d) 97 (1949).
The term "imputed negligence" refers to the rule which places on one person
responsibility for the negligence of another. It is usually invoked to defeat liability
to the plaintiff in a negligence action by charging him with the concurrent negligence of a third person. In order to impute the negligence of one person to another,
there must exist between the parties some special relation, such as master and
servant, principal and agent, or joint enterprise. 2 The relation between them
must be one invoking the principles of agency, one in which the person to whom
the negligence is imputed had a legal right to control the action of the person
actually negligent. 3 The rule is applied to joint enterprisers because each member
has authority to act for all in the control of the means used to execute their common
purpose.4 However, it is generally held that the doctrine is inapplicable in actions
between members of the joint enterprise.5 The reason usually given is that since
the doctrine is based upon the agency relation between the parties, and an agent
is liable to his principal for injuries caused by the agent's negligence, 6 a negligent
joint enterpriser should be liable to a fellow enterpriser for injuries caused by his
negligence. 7 Courts do not favor the doctrine, which is obviously a fiction, and
they try to limit its application.8 Many courts emphasize the unjustness of allowing
one joint enterpriser to injure another tortiously with immunity.9 However, since
Three judges concurred, but thought the parties were not joint enterprisers.
Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849) originated the doctrine
of imputed negligence, holding that the contributory negligence of a driver will be imputed
to a passenger to bar recovery against a third person. This case is repudiated everywhere today.
Michigan was the last state to overrule it. Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W. (2d)
105 (1946).
3 Hines v. Welch, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 229 S.W. 681; Koplitz v. City of St. Paul,
86 Minn. 373, 90 N.W. 794 (1902); 45 C.J., Negligence §573 (1928); 38 AM. JuR., Negligence §235 (1941).
4 For a general discussion of imputed negligence and joint enterprisers see 20 M1NN. L.
REv. 401 (1936).
5 Thompson v. Farrand, 217 Iowa 160, 251 N.W. 44 (1933); Garrotto v. Butera, 123
Neb. 682, 243 N.W. 879 (1932). For other cases, see 62 A.L.R. 442 (1929) and 85 A.L.R.
632 (1933).
6 Grusiecki v. Jaglay, 260 Mich. 9, 244 N.W. 211 (1932); MECHEM, OUTLINllS OP
THE I.Aw OP AGENCY, 3d ed., §324 (1923); 3 C.J.S., Agency §162 (1936).
7 Harber v. Graham, 105 N.J.L. 213, 143 A. 340 (1928); Campbell v. Campbell, 104
Vt. 468, 162 A. 379 (1932); Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N.E. 137 (1929).
8 Gilmore v. Grass, (C.C.A. 10th, 1933) 68 F. (2d) 150; Lachow v. Kimmich, 263
Mich. 1, 248 N.W. 531 (1933); PRo.ssER, ToRTS §§55, 65 (1941). The doctrine of imputed
negligence is not recognized in Oklahoma. LaFayette v. Bass, 122 Okla. 182, 252 P. 1101
(1926).
o McCombs v. Ellsberry, 337 Mo. 491, 85 S.W. (2d) 135 (1935); O'Brien v. Woldson,
149 Wash. 192, 270 P. 304 (1928); Wilmes v. Fournier, Ill Misc. 9, 180 N.Y.S. 860
(1920).
.
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Frisorger v. Shepse, 10 the Michigan court has held, contrary to the overwhelming
weight of authority, that the doctrine of imputed negligence would bar recovery
in an action between the joint enterprisers. In previous cases, the court had held,
along with other jurisdictions, that the contributory negligence of a driver member
of a joint enterprise is imputable to a passenger member so as to bar the latter's
rights to recover against a third party.11 Then came the Frisorger case, in which
the plaintiff was a passenger member of a joint enterprise, with the defendant
the driver of the car. Suit was against the driver and his father, who owned the
car and consented to its being driven, but who was not a member of the joint
enterprise. The Michigan court found for the defendants, citing the previous
cases, but it did not consider whether a distinction should be made between the
son, a member of the joint enterprise, and the father who was not. This decision
was followed in several later cases, without any consideration of its reasons or _
results.12 It appears that the Michigan court drifted into this line of decisions
without sufficient reHection. The court recognized that the doctrine of imputed
negligence is based on an agency !elation,13 but refused to follow the wellestablished rule of agency that an agent is liable to his principal for damages
resulting to the principal from the agent's negligent conduct. The principal case
places the Michigan court in line ~th the majority, and overrules a most unreasonable and unjust group of decisions.
Nancy]. Ringland

10 251 Mich. 121, 230 N.W. 926 (1930).
11 Farthing v. Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380,

220 N.W. 708 (1928); Hanser v. Youngs,
212 Mich. 508, 180 N.W. 409 (1920).
12 Johnson v. Fischer, 292 Mich. 78, 290 N.W. 334 (1940); Hopkins v. Golden, 281
Mich. 389, 275 N.W. 184 (1937); Bushie v. Johnson, 296 Mich. 8, 295 N.W. 538 (1941).
13 Farthing v. Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380, 220 N.W. 708 (1928).

